OpenBazaar is a peer-to-peer marketplace for ordinary physical and digital goods paid in bitcoin. The original system (developed from 2014, with its last substantial releases in 2020) published stores over IPFS, carried orders over libp2p, and protected buyers with a 2-of-3 multisignature escrow whose script and moderator key appeared on chain when it was spent. This paper presents a redesign of the network and argues which of its security and privacy properties hold, and under which assumptions.
Stores and listings are public, content-addressed records signed with BIP 340 Schnorr signatures over a canonical encoding, and carry the vendor's own content labels; third parties can publish signed label sets that buyers choose to follow, and all filtering happens on the buyer's device. Orders are private letters sealed with HPKE to a single vendor and delivered to that vendor's onion-service mailbox; a client device talks only to its owner's node. Payments go directly to the vendor, one transaction per seller. Moderated purchases use a scriptless escrow: a MuSig2 Taproot key-path output whose timeout and dispute spends are all presigned before funding. A dispute is settled by an adaptor signature whose completing secret is split between the favored party and a moderator half that the losing party verifiably encrypts to the moderator. The moderator never holds a signing key over the funds and cannot change any payout.
We state the threat model, specify the escrow protocol with the checks each party must run and its block-height timeline, argue the security properties, tabulate what every observer learns, and state the limitations and open problems, including a moderator-fee bias, the size of the verifiable encryption, and collusion between the moderator and one party. Measurements of a reference implementation show that catalog signing, verification, and order sealing cost well under a millisecond, and that the escrow's verifiable encryption costs about 50 KB and 50 ms per share.